In this paper we propose a secure and efficient off-line electronic transaction protocol based on an IDbased public key encryption system and group signature schemes, which is constructed from bilinear pairings. The anonymity of the customer is revocable by a trustee in case of dispute. Because the amount of communication in the payment protocol is about 1280 bits, our off-line electronic transaction protocol can be used in the wireless networks with the limited bandwidth or the limited-storage environment such as smart card.
Introduction
Recently, a variety of on-line businesses are rapidly emerging over the Internet, which are considered to be some of the most efficient and convenient ways to provide all electronic services. An efficient and secure electronic transaction protocol plays an important role to support these businesses safely as a trustful payment over the Internet.
Since Chaum proposed untraceable electronic cash systems based on blind signatures in 1982 [1] , various extended systems have been proposed, which provide functionalities such as anonymity, double spending prevention, unforgeability, untraceability and efficiency [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . Off-line electronic cash systems were first introduced in [7] and then developed further in [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . In these cases the bank's involvement in the payment transaction between a customer and a merchant was eliminated. Customers withdraw electronic coins from the bank and use them to pay a merchant (a shop). The merchant subsequently deposits the coins back to the bank. Most off-line electronic cash systems use a restricted form of blind signatures to implement anonymity. The revocable e-cash system [14] , [15] (or fair payment system) in which anonymity can be revoked when needed, becomes one of the active research areas of preventing such misuses. In the revocable e-cash scheme, the identification of an illegal user can be traced by the cooperation of a trustee and a bank.
Along with countermeasures [14] , [16] against the blackmailing and money laundering, many schemes in [15] , [17] , [18] have been proposed to resist against the abuse of anonymity. The scheme suggested by Camenisch et al. [19] requires the trustee to take part in the initialization phase but does not provide a prevention against extortion and blindfolding attacks. Some schemes were suggested to prevent these attacks. Fujisaki and Okamoto's scheme [17] and Jakobsson and Yung's scheme [18] are said to be not efficient in the sense that the users need to communicate with a trustee in every payment phase. Recently, Wang, Cao and Zhang [20] proposed an off-line payment scheme in which the anonymity of consumers is scalable. Consumers can get the required anonymity without showing their identities to any third party. However, the authors in [21] show that in Wang, Cao and Zhang's scheme, given a valid coin and without knowing any secret information, everyone is able to spend the coin as many times as he wants.
In this paper we propose a secure off-line electronic transaction protocol based on an ID-based public key encryption system and group signature schemes. In order to construct our electronic cash system, we use the group signature of X. Chen, F. Zhang, K. Kim [22] and the blind signature of Schnorr [23] . The proposed off-line electronic cash system is provable secure. Its security is based on the ID-based public key encryption system [24] , which is constructed from bilinear pairings. We discuss some aspects of security of our off-line electronic cash system, such as: the anonymity of the customer and the security against the forgery of the coin. Because the amount of communication in the payment protocol is about 1280 bits, our off-line electronic transaction protocol can be used in the wireless networks with the limited bandwidth or in the Internet environment (payments using smart cards).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the properties of bilinear pairings and group signatures. Then we present our off-line electronic transaction protocol in section 3. Furthermore, we discuss some aspects of security and efficiency in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes the work of this paper.
Cryptographic Tools
In this section we review bilinear pairings, the ID-based public key systems and the properties of a group signature scheme which will be used in the subsequent design of our off-line electronic transaction protocol. We call 1 G a gap Diffie-Hellman group if the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem can be solved in polynomial time but there is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem or Discrete Logarithm Problem with nonnegligible probability. Such a group can be found in supersingular elliptic curves of hyperelliptic curves defined over finite fields and the bilinear pairings can be derived from Weil or Tate pairings. For more details, see [25] , [26] .
Bilinear pairings

ID-based public key setting from bilinear pairings
The ID-based public key systems, introduced by Shamir [24] , allow some public information of the user such as name, address and email etc., rather than an arbitrary string to be used as his public key. The private key of the user is calculated by Private Key Generator (PKG) and sent to the user via a secure channel. ID-based public key setting from bilinear pairings can be implemented as follows [27] , [22] :
Let 1 G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q , 2 G be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q . A bilinear pairing is a map 
Group signatures
Group signature schemes are a relatively recent cryptographic concept introduced by Chaum and van Heyst [28] in 1991. An application of a group signature scheme is the electronic cash as it was pointed out in [29] . In this case, several banks issue coins, but it is impossible for shops to find out which bank issued a coin that is obtained from a customer. The central bank plays the role of the group manager and all other banks issuing coins are group members.
A group signature scheme is comprised of the following procedures:
1. Setup: an algorithm that generates the group public key and a group secret key for the group manager. 2. Join: a protocol between the group manager and a potential member that generates the user's secret key and public key. 3. Sign: a protocol between a group member and a user which, on input the message m from the user and the signer's secret key, the membership certificate and membership key, produces a signature on the message m . 4. Verify: an algorithm which, on input the group public key and the group signature for the message, decides the validity of the signature. 5. Open: an algorithm which, given a signed message and a group secret key, returns the identity of the signer together with a proof of this fact.
A group signature scheme [30] allows the members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group such that the following properties hold:
1. Correctness: Signatures produced by a group member using the sign procedure must be accepted by the verify procedure. 2. Unforgeability: Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group. 3. Anonymity: Given a signature, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone but the group manager. 4. Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different signatures were computed by the same group member is computationally hard. 5. Traceability: The group manager can always establish the identity of the member who issued a valid signature. 6. No framing: Even if the group manager and some of the group members collude, they cannot sign on behalf of noninvolved group members. 7. Coalition-resistance: A colluding subset of group members cannot generate a valid signature that the group manager cannot link to one of the colluding group members.
Proposed Off-line Protocol
The proposed protocol consists of four types of participants: customers, merchants, banks and trusted parties. The customers honestly withdraw money from the bank and pay money to the merchant. The merchants get money from customers and deposit it in the bank. The banks manage customer accounts, issue and redeem money. The bank can legally trace a dishonest customer with the help of the trusted parties. An e-cash system is anonymous if the bank in collaboration with the merchant cannot trace the coin to the customer. The system is off-line if during payment the merchant does not communicate with the bank.
In our off-line electronic transaction protocol, all customers who open a bank account form a group and a Private Key Generator (trusted party) is the group manager. We assume that in our electronic cash system, the group manager is a trusted party like the country's Central Bank (e.g. the US Treasury). When a customer wants to withdraw an electronic coin from his account, the bank applies a blind signature protocol [23] to this coin and decreases appropriate amount from the customer's account. Everyone including the merchant can verify the validity of the blind signature. The withdrawals are made by the bank by applying the blind signature of Schnorr [23] to a coin randomly selected by a customer and the payments are made by the customer by applying the group signature of Chen, Zhang, Kim [22] to the random coin. We use a group signature scheme in our protocol for the following reasons. First, we need the traceability of a group signature scheme in the tracing protocol. The group manager can trace the identity of the customer who makes a double spending and sends it to the bank. Second, in our registration protocol, we use the Join procedure of a group signature scheme, that is, any customer who wants to withdraw a coin from the bank has to interact with the group manager and obtains a membership certificate. 
System setup
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The Bank:
To setup his parameters, the bank performs the following: 
The registration protocol
Any customer who wants to withdraw a coin from the bank has to interact with the group manager and obtains a membership certificate. We assume that communication between the customer and the group manager is secure, i.e., private and authentic. 
The withdrawal protocol
The withdrawal protocol allows a customer to withdraw e-coins from the bank. After having open a bank account, the customer withdraws an e-coin from his account by using blind signature. Therefore, the bank cannot link the e-coin to the identity of the customer but can debit to the account correctly. The withdrawal protocol involves the customer and the bank in which the customer withdraws an electronic coin from the bank. First, the customer proves his identity to the bank and then the bank uses blind Schnorr signature [23] to sign the e-coin. Also, we assume that communication between the customer and the bank is secure, i.e., private and authentic [31] , [32] .
The customer must perform the following protocol with the bank: 
The payment protocol
In the proposed off-line transaction protocol, during payment the merchant does not communicate with the bank. The payment protocol involves the customer and the merchant and should be done through a secure channel (i.e., data privacy and integrity). After withdrawing e-coins, the customer can pay for what the merchant provided. Then the merchant verifies the validity of the received e-coins.
In order to sign the coin c , the customer uses the group signature scheme of Chen, Zhang, Kim [22] 
If the equations (10), (11) and (12) of used coin still can pass verification of (10) and (11) . The merchant needs to check the linkage of the new coin and its signature.
The deposit protocol
The deposit protocol permits the merchant to deposit the received e-coins to the bank. When receiving the deposited requirement from the merchant, the bank first verifies the validity of received e-coins and then credits the account of the merchant. In the on-line e-cash system this protocol is part of the payment protocol as executed by the merchant. In our system, the deposit protocol is executed at a later moment, preferably in batch mode. The bank holds a record of spent cash to prevent double spending of e-cash. The bank cannot link deposited coins to a customer without collaboration from the group manager. The deposit protocol involves the merchant and the bank as follows: 
The tracing protocol
The bank can legally trace the customer of a paid coin with the help of the group manager. The tracing protocol involves the bank and the group manager as follows: (14) 4. The group manager searches through the group customer list to get the identity of the customer and sends it to the bank. Also, the group manager cannot misattribute a signature to frame the customer unless he can compute bP given P , aP and rP which satisfies:
The authors in [22] 
Security and Efficiency Analysis
In this section we discuss some aspects of security and efficiency of our off-line electronic transaction protocol. The following theorem proves the anonymity of our system. Theorem 1 Our off-line electronic transaction protocol achieves anonymity w.r.t. the bank, i.e., it is infeasible for the bank to trace a customer without the cooperation of the group manager.
Proof:
The identity of a honest customer is anonymous and cannot be linked with the ecash. However, the customer who makes a double spending will be traced by the bank with the help of the group manager using the tracing protocol. In this case, the group manager searches through the group customer list to get the identity of the customer and sends it to the bank. For an honest customer, the Schnorr blind signature will be used when he withdraws the coin c from the bank, so that the bank cannot link a coin to the honest owner of the coin without the group manager's help. Since u x is randomly chosen, then P rx u reveals no information about the customer's identity to anyone except the group manager. Also, since We evaluate the storage space and computational time of the costly operations. Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the storage space and computation cost respectively, of different protocols of our system and the schemes in [2] and [3] . The overall efficiency is improved in our electronic transaction protocol compared to Au et al.'s system [2] and Canard et al.'s system [3] in terms of the storage space and the computation cost. Our protocol has a point P of 160 bits and q of 160 bits. For a moderate value 10 = L and 40 = t , the payment protocol in [3] requires 1673 multi-based exponentiations and a total bandwidth of 30740 bits. The payment protocol in [2] requires 800 multi-based exponentiations, 14 pairings and a total bandwidth of 5188 bits. In contrast, the payment protocol in our system requires 1 multi-based exponentiation, 4 pairings and a total bandwidth of 1280 bits.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a secure and efficient off-line electronic transaction protocol based on a ID-based public key encryption system and group signature schemes. In order to construct our off-line electronic transaction protocol, we used the group signature of Chen, Zhang, Kim and the blind signature of Schnorr. Because the amount of communication between customer and merchant is about 1280 bits, the proposed off-line transaction protocol can be used in the wireless networks with the limited bandwidth or in the limited-storage environment such as the smart card. 
